The first of five scenarios for the regional order around 2050, which the report says reflects a Japanese perspective, is a return to power politics among several great powers. After the Second World War the United States upheld a liberal international order through its strength, but as that strength weakens revisionist forces such as China and Russia are emerging. A more plural order could take shape, with US-China confrontation in East Asia and Russia exerting great-power influence in Europe. The rise of regional powers such as Iran could further reinforce the revisionist trend. If US engagement in each region weakens, the report judges that this multipolar system is likely to lead gradually to insecurity.

The second scenario is one in which US-China confrontation persists but confrontation and coexistence exist side by side. If the world divides into two camps centered on Washington and Beijing, competition between the blocs would accelerate, yet a nuclear balance makes direct clashes unlikely. In such confrontational coexistence Korea and Japan would most likely belong to the US camp, their ties with China would weaken and they would increasingly align with the US strategy of containing China. The report ranks this among the three relatively most plausible scenarios and expects the two countries to strengthen cooperation around their US alliances while maintaining security cooperation with partners such as Australia and the Philippines. As the rivalry takes on the form of military confrontation and tensions rise in hot spots, the threats facing Korea and Japan would also grow.

The third scenario sees middle powers forming a pluralistic regional order while geopolitical competition among the United States, China and Russia continues. Middle powers would prevent great-power military rivalry from sliding into war, widen the scope of cooperation and strengthen multilateral institutional cooperation. Korea and Japan could exercise important leadership in East Asian security cooperation and help avert conflict by reinforcing multilateral bodies. The report judges that this path offers the greatest potential for Korea-Japan cooperation, because every East Asian state fears militarized US-China rivalry and an unstable world order. If the two democratic middle powers, already deepening ties with Australia, India and ASEAN, could lead in shaping an order that eases the rivalry, it would contribute greatly to regional stability.

The fourth scenario combines continued economic interdependence among great powers with intensifying political and security conflict. Even as geopolitical competition grows, most countries still argue for a high level of economic interdependence, and both the Biden and Trump administrations have kept up ordinary trade with China while calling for strategic decoupling. Without an extreme all-out war, competition and confrontation would persist at many levels, and Korea and Japan would try to maximize national interests within a complex web of rivalry and cooperation. Security and economic interests would intersect intricately, since economic and technological disputes would continue even if a geopolitical balance keeps the status quo. The report sees shared interests for the two countries in resolving economic disputes, blocking attempts to change the status quo through economic coercion and restoring global multilateral economic institutions such as the WTO.

The fifth scenario is one in which the past US-centered liberal order is not fully restored, but its elements are maintained and reinforced at a new level. The United States still holds overwhelming military and economic power compared with other states, and its global influence has also grown. Revisionist powers such as China and Russia are rising, but they face many problems of their own and would find it hard to become hegemons that surpass the United States. If Washington sustains high growth and leads in military innovation and advanced technology, it could preserve the liberal international order in a modified form. Challenges from revisionist states would continue, yet the liberal order would be restored and sustained in a new shape.

A Catalyst for Common Good asks whether long-term uncertainty could become the greatest investment opportunity. A global equity fund would combine decentralised governance for transparency with capital from multilateral development banks to scale breakthrough innovations in climate, energy, food and water security. Energy transitions, climate resilience and development in low- and middle-income countries face an estimated $2.5 trillion annual funding gap. These challenges are interconnected and need sustained investment, and while the Paris Agreement, the SDGs and the UN Pact for the Future all take a long view, existing investment structures remain focused on short horizons. Mobilising global innovation and aligning with shared goals are the expected benefits, while the risks include the familiar problems of public goods, the complexity of decentralised fund governance and uncertain continuity of funding.

The plan argues that the present era is defined by the coexistence of a great regression and endless change. On the regression side it sees the world order moving backwards rather than forwards. The concrete forms it names are a wavering globalisation combined with stronger inequality, the rise of populism with a retreat of democracy, and the exhaustion of a civic culture of solidarity and integration. These features are presented as global conditions rather than as problems unique to Korea. The plan treats them as the backdrop against which it calls for a new recovery built on inclusive growth.

With tariff negotiations between the US and its major partners wrapping up, the report sees a Turnberry system emerging that goes beyond the WTO framework. The new trade order focuses on rebalancing the global industrial and trade order so that American interests and security are guaranteed. This shift is expected to act as a catalyst for a major reorganisation of global production networks now centred on Northeast Asia. High US tariffs are expected to pull more investment toward the United States. For Korea, concerns are high about foreign exchange market stability, a domestic investment vacuum and a weakening manufacturing ecosystem. The report adds that pressure from combined US trade and industrial policy could drain investment capacity away from domestic strategic industries.

The report argues that a few global technology companies have grown in size and influence as they expand across countries and into a wider range of economic and social services, which makes regulation harder. The growing dominance of a small group of providers creates operational, financial and security dependency risks and constrains market innovation and consumer choice. These firms exploit economies of scale and significant market power, and high entry barriers such as large investments and specialist expertise reinforce their position. Integrated ecosystems of products and services keep users inside their networks and make switching to competitors less likely. The concentration of vast amounts of personal data in these firms also increases breach risks and raises concerns about transparency and accountability in data handling.